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TESTING OUR TEACHERS 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, a number of school districts have begun drug testing their 
teachers, only to find that the Supreme Court’s special needs exception is 
failing. As it has in other corners of its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the 
Court has erected an exception predicated on a vague “reasonableness” 
standard, the application of which often varies with the ad hoc interpretations 
of individual courts. Courts assessing the applicability of the special needs 
exception to the drug testing of public school teachers have, in the absence of 
clear analytical guideposts, found a patchwork of inconsistent judicial 
opinions. As a result, school boards wishing to implement drug testing policies 
find themselves in a difficult situation, uncertain where their obligation to 
protect their students must give way to their teachers’ reasonable expectations 
of privacy. The example of teacher drug testing is but one example of where 
the special needs exception has left government employers uncertain as to their 
ability to act. 
This Comment represents an effort to infuse a degree of certainty into the 
Court’s drug testing cases specifically and the special needs doctrine 
generally. In so doing, it identifies two areas in which the Court’s current 
special needs analysis lacks sufficiently robust standards to provide 
meaningful guidance to lower courts: the front-end “special need” designation 
and the evaluation of the particular drug testing policy’s efficacy. Looking to 
the Court’s drug testing cases, this Comment identifies three analytical 
standards that must be present for a court to find a special need. Utilizing 
social-control theory and utilitarian theories of punishment, it then fleshes out 
the efficacy prong into a comprehensive framework for assessing the 
particular circumstances in which a particular drug testing policy actually 
advances the purported need. Finally, the Comment takes these new analytical 
tools and applies them to the case of teacher drug testing. This discussion 
illustrates the potential for a principled, consistent framework for protecting 
individual privacy without unduly limiting the government’s ability to act. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s special needs exception, like so many other aspects of the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,1 is a disaster. Evolving from an 
understanding that the Framers, through the Reasonableness Clause,2 granted 
the Fourth Amendment the flexibility to adapt to new technologies and 
contexts,3 this exception allows the government to conduct warrantless 
searches when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, 
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”4 In such 
cases, a court assesses the reasonableness of a given search by balancing the 
intrusion on an individual’s privacy interests against the promotion of 
government interests.5 As the special needs exception has allowed for 
government searches to spill outside of the traditional law enforcement 
context, a far greater number of citizens, ranging from potential terrorists6 to 
high school choir members,7 have found themselves subject to warrantless 
intrusions on their privacy whenever an individual court is willing to 
acknowledge a sufficient need. 
In attempting to set meaningful limits on the exception, courts have found 
themselves tasked with parsing a doctrine “with all of the character and 
 
 1 See Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local 
Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998) (“The Supreme Court cases 
construing the Fourth Amendment are a mess that lacks coherence and predictability, and fails to communicate 
the contours of the field.”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 352 (1974) (“Even for a lone theoretician—for a monarchal, everlasting fourth amendment 
enforcer—the complications would render a coherent construction of the fourth amendment exceedingly 
difficult.”). 
 2 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 3 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 818 (1994) 
(“‘Reasonableness’ is not some set of specific rules, frozen in 1791 or 1868 amber . . . .”); Amsterdam, supra 
note 1, at 399 (“What we do know, because the language of the fourth amendment says so, is that the framers 
were disposed to generalize to some extent beyond the evils of the immediate past.”); Carol S. Steiker, 
Response, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994) (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment, more than many other parts of the Constitution, appears to require a fairly high level of 
abstraction of purpose; its use of the term ‘reasonable’ (actually, ‘unreasonable’) positively invites 
constructions that change with changing circumstances.”). 
 4 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
 6 See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 7 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
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consistency of a Rorschach blot.”8 For these courts, the confusion is 
definitional: At what point or in which circumstances does a purported 
governmental need become “special”? Courts are at least in agreement that a 
special need exists when public safety is genuinely at issue.9 Whether a court 
finds that safety interests are actually implicated, though, often turns more on 
judicial policy preferences than on the consistent application of articulable 
standards to this critical front-end question.10 The result is a patchwork of 
opinions that often leaves the government uncertain where its ability to act 
begins and the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy must give way. 
Perhaps nowhere is the ambiguity of the special needs exception more 
apparent than in the context of governmental drug testing. Take, for example, 
school boards today, which find themselves navigating the narrow strait 
between Scylla and Charybdis in deciding whether to implement suspicionless 
drug testing policies for their teachers. Veer too close to the rocks by 
implementing a drug testing policy, and risk the possibility of costly litigation 
for infringing on the reasonable privacy expectations of those teachers. But run 
up against the whirlpool, and risk that the whole ship might be lost—that the 
failure to exercise all available means of protecting students from the dangers 
inherent in the school setting might jeopardize the ability of each school to 
operate effectively. 
Teachers’ unions claim that the implementation of these suspicionless drug 
testing policies amounts to little more than a quixotic endeavor—teacher drug 
use, they assert, is simply not a prevalent societal problem.11 And indeed, a 
 
 8 Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 375. Professor Akhil Reed Amar has criticized the arbitrary character that 
the Supreme Court has given the Fourth Amendment: 
The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. . . . As a matter of text, history, and 
plain old common sense, the[] three pillars of modern Fourth Amendment case law are hard to 
support; in fact, today’s Supreme Court does not really support them. Except when it does. 
Warrants are not required—unless they are. All searches and seizures must be grounded in 
probable cause—but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully seized evidence must be excluded 
whenever five votes say so. 
Amar, supra note 3, at 757–58 (footnote omitted). 
 9 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.2(g), 
at 85 (4th ed. 2004). 
 10 See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 
§ 11.3.4.4.2.2, at 501 (2008) (“[T]he conclusion that a special need is present appears to be little more than a 
facade for policy results . . . .”). 
 11 See Vaishali Honawar, Random Drug Tests Test Teacher Privacy Rights, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 
2009, at A1 (“Folks who go into teaching are not the kind who use drugs . . . .” (quoting Michael Simpson, 
assistant general counsel for the National Education Association) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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2007 study found, when asking teachers whether they had used illicit drugs in 
the prior month, that only 4.1% reported drug use—one of the lowest rates 
among the occupational categories surveyed.12 But, for school districts, this 
study reveals a more significant truth: while drug use among teachers may not 
be pervasive, it does occur.13 Were this statistic to bear out in equal measure 
across all school districts, one would expect the average public school student 
to have two or three teachers over the course of her primary education who are 
admitted drug users.14 To many school districts, the relevant consideration is 
not the proportion of teachers using drugs but the belief that a given district 
cannot accept the risk of one rotten apple spoiling the bushel.15 As a result, 
school boards and legislatures in a number of states—including Hawaii,16 
Illinois,17 Kentucky,18 Louisiana,19 North Carolina,20 Tennessee,21 and West 
Virginia22—have enacted or attempted to enact suspicionless urinalysis testing 
schemes for their teachers and other personnel who interact daily with 
students. When these policies have faced Fourth Amendment challenges, 
courts have been forced to wrestle with the question of whether teachers 
present safety risks that create a special need and, if so, whether drug testing 
would actually address that need.23 
 
 12 SHARON L. LARSON ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORKER SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
WORKPLACE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 23 fig.3.1 (2007), available at http://www.amfetaminadronet.org/ 
comunicazioni/news/samhsa_work.pdf. 
 13 Id. 
 14 This calculation operates on the assumption that a student will have five teachers per year—or sixty-
five total—between kindergarten and her final year of high school. The estimate does not include substitute 
teachers, coaches, and teachers performing only supervisory functions over the student (e.g., hall monitors), 
which would lead to a much higher statistic. 
 15 LARSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 23 fig.3.1. 
 16 See Honawar, supra note 11 (random drug testing policy). 
 17 See Greg Stewart, Random Drug Testing of Teachers a First in Peoria Area, PJSTAR.COM (Aug. 18, 
2011, 12:14 PM), http://www.pjstar.com/news/x1510867577/Testing-teachers-a-first-in-area (discussing a 
proposed random drug testing policy that resulted in a teachers’ strike). 
 18 See Crager v. Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 692 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (random drug testing policy). 
 19 See, e.g., United Teachers of New Orleans v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 855 (5th Cir. 
1998) (post-accident and pre-employment drug testing policies); Reno v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 697 
F. Supp. 2d 659, 660 (M.D. La. 2010) (post-injury drug testing policy). 
 20 See Jones v. Graham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 677 S.E.2d 171, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (random drug 
testing policy). 
 21 See Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 366–67 (6th Cir. 1998) (drug 
testing upon hire or transfer); Smith Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Smith Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 781 F. Supp. 2d 604, 607 
(M.D. Tenn. 2011) (pre-employment, random, and post-injury drug testing). 
 22 See Am. Fed’n of Teachers—W. Va. v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883, 886 (S.D. 
W. Va. 2009) (random drug testing policy). 
 23 This Comment addresses only the permissibility of suspicionless drug testing of teachers under the 
special needs exception of the Fourth Amendment. For an account of how courts have addressed challenges to 
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The Sixth Circuit, in Knox County Education Ass’n v. Knox County Board 
of Education, offered the earliest federal attempt to address whether teachers’ 
drug use created a special need.24 The Knox County Board of Education had 
passed a “Drug-Free Workplace Substance Abuse Policy,” which called for 
suspicionless drug testing of all individuals who applied for, transferred to, or 
received a promotion to a teaching position.25 The Knox County Education 
Association challenged the policy as violative of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.26 After acknowledging 
that the Knox County School System had no documented history of drug 
abuse, the court determined that the school board had prophylactic power 
under the special needs exception as long as teachers occupied positions that 
were “safety sensitive.”27 In finding that a special need existed, the court 
observed that teachers are the school’s front line for safety and that any 
momentary lapse of attention could have far-reaching consequences for student 
well-being.28 This need for constant supervision was not limited to young 
children horsing around; even at the high-school level, teachers were 
responsible for identifying and preventing drug use, as well as reporting 
violent acts, such as assaults.29 After accepting the special need for drug testing 
and weighing that safety interest against the invasiveness of urinalysis testing, 
the Knox court upheld the suspicionless drug testing scheme.30 
In American Federation of Teachers—West Virginia v. Kanawha County 
Board of Education, a West Virginia district court took a different tack.31 The 
Kanawha County Board of Education had revised its “Employee Drug Use 
Prevention Policy” to implement a new random drug testing scheme that 
applied to all who occupied “safety-sensitive positions,” defined to include 
 
suspicionless drug testing policies under state constitutions, see Amanda Harmon Cooley et al., The 
Constitutional and Contractual Controversy of Suspicionless Drug Testing of Public School Teachers, 63 
OKLA. L. REV. 421, 449–57 (2011). 
 24 Knox, 158 F.3d 361. 
 25 Id. at 363. 
 26 Id. at 364. 
 27 Id. at 373–76. 
 28 Id. at 378; accord Donegan v. Livingston, No. 3:11-cv-812, 2012 WL 2586862, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 
2012) (noting that “teachers’ privacy to ingest substances at work is ‘diminished by reasons of their 
participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, 
on the health and fitness of covered employees’” and that “teachers inhabit a highly regulated environment 
which is particularly sensitive to alcohol and drug abuse” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 627 (1989))). 
 29 Knox, 158 F.3d at 378.  
 30 Id. at 384. 
 31 592 F. Supp. 2d 883 (S.D. W. Va. 2009). 
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teachers.32 A teachers’ union filed suit, claiming, among other things, that the 
random drug testing violated the Fourth Amendment.33 After establishing that 
the existence of a special need depended on the magnitude of the purported 
safety concern,34 the court concluded that “[b]umps and bruises of students 
tussling in the hallways or on the playground are not special needs.”35 In so 
doing, the court required a safety risk comparable to those found compelling in 
other drug testing cases, such as those involving airline personnel and nuclear-
power-plant engineers.36 Finding the absence of such a need, the district court 
granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the board’s 
suspicionless testing scheme.37 
A third case shifted the focus, clarifying that, when assessing the special 
need, the question is not merely whether the need exists but whether the search 
at issue actually serves the need. In United Teachers of New Orleans v. 
Orleans Parish School Board, a local school district required that a teacher 
submit to urinalysis testing upon the occurrence of an injury, even if that injury 
had no relationship to drug activity.38 Avoiding an inquiry into the safety issue 
entirely, the court focused on the school board’s inaccurate invocation of the 
special needs exception. The court viewed the policy—which in operation only 
served to facilitate the denial of workers’ compensation benefits, rather than 
address a safety interest in any meaningful way—as little more than an 
“immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug 
use.”39 Accordingly, the court enjoined the school board from enforcing the 
testing scheme.40 
These three cases highlight two undertheorized areas within not only the 
teacher drug testing debate but also the special needs analysis generally. First, 
the absence of clear guideposts for identifying the existence of a special need 
allows judicial policy preferences too much play in the joints. Where one court 
sees teachers as the front line in the battle against drug use and violence in 
schools, another sees mere “[b]umps and bruises.” Second, even when a 
 
 32 Id. at 886–87. 
 33 Id. at 888–89. 
 34 Id. at 903. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 904. 
 37 Id. at 904–06. 
 38 142 F.3d 853, 856 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 39 Id. at 857 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 40 Id. 
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special need exists, there may be instances where a court should be skeptical of 
a drug testing scheme because the need that justifies the search may not always 
be a need the search actually serves. A full exposition of this efficacy prong of 
the special needs analysis has yet to be offered. 
This Comment, using the teacher drug testing debate as a case study, 
suggests orienting these two areas of ambiguity within the special needs 
doctrine on a new analytical framework. Part I traces the development of the 
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment from general warrants to 
public school urinalysis. Building off this background, Part II then evaluates 
where the Supreme Court’s case law has left the special needs exception and 
suggests two standards that will provide greater consistency within courts’ 
special needs analyses while remaining faithful to the Fourth Amendment’s 
underlying purposes. First, the Part proposes a three-step inquiry that aligns the 
special needs designation along considerations of context—considerations that 
have always been central to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Second, the Part, 
discussing the role of formal and informal sanctioning mechanisms within 
institutions, identifies when a drug test will actually advance the special need, 
providing a fuller understanding of the Court’s cursory nods to efficacy. 
Part III returns to the debate that began this Comment. This Part begins by 
outlining the safety risks that teacher drug testing policies aim to address. With 
those risks identified, it proceeds to apply the analytical standards proposed in 
Part II to assess the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing policies of 
public school teachers. In so doing, this Comment illustrates the potential of 
the proposed analytical tools to better align future special needs analyses with 
the purposes that led to the doctrine’s inception—that, when encroaching on 
individual privacy, the government retains the power to act as a shield, without 
wielding the sword. 
I. FROM GENERAL WARRANTS TO SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTS 
Against the backdrop of general warrants and the unfettered discretion they 
granted government officials to intrude upon the everyman, the Fourth 
Amendment found life.41 Beginning in the 1750s, British customs officials 
relied on legislation passed by Parliament to issue writs of assistance to combat 
 
 41 CLANCY, supra note 10, § 2.3, at 40; Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: 
Suspicionless Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 506 (2004). 
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the pervasive problem of smuggling in the colonies.42 These writs granted 
government officials the authority to search for untaxed imported goods 
without any individualized suspicion or judicially imposed limits as to the 
search’s scope.43 Almost immediately, the general searches created deep 
resentment among the colonists, with James Otis’s failed attack on behalf of 
Boston merchants in the Superior Court of Massachusetts serving as a 
powerful unifying symbol.44 
At the same time that discontent with the writs of assistance began to 
foment, stories of similar abuses of the general warrant in England spread 
among the colonists. In Wilkes v. Wood, the Court of Common Pleas assessed 
the ability of Lord Halifax to authorize the arrest of an individual and the 
search of his papers.45 The warrant in that case, specifying neither the place to 
be searched nor the people to be seized, resulted in the arrest of more than 
twenty-four people.46 In Entick v. Carrington, the King’s Bench assessed the 
validity of a search of an individual’s papers under a warrant lacking a 
summons, examination, hearing, or any proof that the individual had actually 
disseminated libelous papers.47 The juries in both cases returned verdicts for 
the plaintiffs,48 and the colonists had reason to believe that the general warrants 
would be similarly objectionable as applied to them. This expectation was 
shattered with the passage of the Townshend Act in 1767.49 Eventually, 
Massachusetts, the colony against which the writs were primarily targeted, 
included within its Declaration of Rights a provision prohibiting “unreasonable 
searches and seizures”—language the Framers eventually adopted in the 
Fourth Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause.50 
Beginning in 1967, the Warren Court drastically expanded the reach of the 
Fourth Amendment. In announcing that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
 
 42 CLANCY, supra note 10, § 2.2.3.1, at 32. In 1696, Parliament passed legislation that appeared to permit 
the use of writs of assistance. Id. When writs issued pursuant to that act were found to be without legal basis in 
the 1760s, the Townshend Act emerged to fill the gap. Id. § 2.2.3.1, at 32 n.47. 
 43 See Sundby, supra note 41, at 506–07. 
 44 CLANCY, supra note 10, § 2.2.3.1, at 32–34. 
 45 (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.); see also Sundby, supra note 41, at 506. 
 46 Sundby, supra note 41, at 506. 
 47 (1765) 98 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.B.) 817; 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 291. 
 48 Id. at 818; Wilkes, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. at 499. 
 49 See CLANCY, supra note 10, § 2.2.3.1, at 34–35 (noting that the Townshend Act was the catalyst for 
the American Revolution and discussing the refusal of many lower courts to issue general writs of assistance 
following the Act’s passage). 
 50 WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 606 
(quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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people, not places,” the Court in Katz v. United States51 granted the Fourth 
Amendment force beyond its explicitly enumerated categories, reflecting the 
recognition that there was no “reason to conclude that the framers intended the 
fourth amendment . . . to state a principle like the dwarf in Gunter Grass’ Tin 
Drum, who suddenly and perversely decided to stop growing because growth 
was what grownups expected of him.”52 That same Term, the Court proceeded 
to diminish the role of probable cause in Terry v. Ohio53 and identified 
“reasonableness,” not a warrant based upon individualized suspicion, as the 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis in Camara v. Municipal 
Court.54 The Court’s application of a reasonableness balancing test to the 
administrative search in Camara presented a new Orwellian nightmare—no 
longer did the Fourth Amendment’s applicability depend on an individual’s 
actions but on a judicial evaluation of a government’s stated objectives.55 
Eighteen years later, in his concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., Justice 
Blackmun expounded on this balancing test and gave the special needs 
exception its first articulation: “Only in those exceptional circumstances in 
which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the 
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to 
substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.”56 Blackmun’s 
approach received quick acceptance, and the Court subsequently determined 
 
 51 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 52 Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 399. 
 53 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 54 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Scott Sundby has written of these watershed decisions, “Camara twisted the 
Warrant Clause into a pretzel and Terry unwittingly cracked the door for a decline in the role of traditional 
probable cause.” Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and 
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1134 (1998) (footnote omitted). 
 55 See Sundby, supra note 54, at 1136. 
 56 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Writing for the majority, Justice 
White instead adopted a two-pronged test for evaluating suspicionless searches of a student’s belongings, 
asking (1) whether the search was “justified at its inception” and (2) whether the search “was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (majority opinion) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20) (internal quotation marks omitted). Though the Court subsequently adopted the 
special needs approach employed in Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, Justice White’s two-pronged analysis 
still has continuing viability. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009); 
see also A. James Spung, Comment, From Backpacks to Blackberries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in 
the Age of the Cell Phone, 61 EMORY L.J. 111 (2011) (discussing Justice White’s majority opinion and its 
application in light of modern technological developments). To the extent that a difference between the two 
standards exists, it appears that the T.L.O. majority approach applies when the search is occasioned by the 
discretionary act of an individual government official, while the special needs approach adheres when the 
search is performed mechanically according to an established program or policy. Perhaps based on that 
distinction, the Court’s drug testing cases have subsequently been evaluated under the special needs approach. 
See infra text accompanying notes 59–113. 
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that suspicionless searches may be reasonable outside of Camara’s 
administrative setting.57 
Around the same time T.L.O. was decided, workplace drug testing had 
begun its move into the government sphere, based primarily on the ability of 
such testing to identify users more effectively than an office supervisor 
could.58 The Court first addressed the constitutionality of workplace drug 
testing in a pair of cases decided the same day. In Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, the Court was faced with a Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) regulation that mandated post-accident blood and urinalysis testing of 
railroad employees.59 Responding to a high number of accidents that resulted 
from on-the-job substance and alcohol abuse, the FRA regulation required that 
all crew members and covered employees involved in an accident be sent to an 
independent medical facility where their urine samples would be collected.60 
The facility then sent the samples to an FRA laboratory for analysis.61 
Typically, a failed drug test resulted in dismissal of the employee.62 
After initially noting that a private entity compelled to perform a search 
under a federal regulation is subject to the Fourth Amendment,63 Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, determined that the testing at issue, which 
had the potential to reveal sensitive medical information and subjected an 
individual to visual or aural monitoring, intruded on an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy and was therefore a search.64 The Court commented that 
 
 57 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. 
CT. REV. 87, 109 (discussing the Court’s increased willingness to allow suspicionless searches, as reflected by 
its decisions in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), and O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)). 
 58 See Sundby, supra note 41, at 510; Karin Schmidt, Note, Suspicionless Drug Urinalysis of Public 
School Teachers: The Concern for Student Safety Cannot Outweigh Teachers’ Legitimate Privacy Interests, 34 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253, 255 (2001) (“This country has been engaged in a war on drugs since the 
1980s . . . .”). 
 59 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989). 
 60 Id. at 607–10. 
 61 Id. at 609–10. 
 62 Id. at 629–30. 
 63 Id. at 614. 
 64 Id. at 617. Justice Kennedy endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s characterization in Von Raab of the privacy 
interest at stake: 
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most 
people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally 
performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally prohibited 
by law as well as social custom. 
Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of this strong language, 
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the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches but instead only those 
that are unreasonable.65 The reasonableness of a given search required a 
balancing of the intrusion on an individual’s privacy interests against the 
promotion of legitimate government interests.66 Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that, although a search is typically unreasonable unless 
accompanied by a warrant based upon probable cause, the Court had 
previously recognized exceptions where the government had a special need for 
the search.67 He found that the government’s interest in regulating the conduct 
of railroad employees for safety created one such special need68 and that the 
imposition of a warrant requirement would impede the government’s ability to 
achieve its purpose.69 
Given the controlled, detached setting in which samples were collected and 
the diminished expectation of privacy held by an employee in an industry 
regulated for safety, the Court saw an intrusion on privacy that was “limited” 
and “minimal.”70 Against this minimal privacy intrusion, the government 
possessed an interest in drug testing that was compelling.71 Employees 
“discharge[d] duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a 
momentary lapse of attention [could] have disastrous consequences,” and those 
employees could “cause great human loss before any signs of impairment 
become noticeable.”72 Before upholding the search, the Court added that the 
unpredictable nature of the policy’s triggering event and the customary 
dismissal sanction offered an appropriate means of deterring drug use.73 
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,74 decided that same day, 
presented a very different drug testing scheme. Despite acknowledging that its 
employees were largely drug free and failing to offer any evidence that even a 
single employee had actually used drugs, the U.S. Customs Service made drug 
testing a precondition to employment for all individuals who would (1) be 
 
perhaps it is surprising that the Court subsequently found that the balance tipped against the privacy interest. 
See Schulhofer, supra note 57, at 136 (“At bottom, the Court may not truly believe that urinalysis is so terribly 
intrusive.”). 
 65 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 620. 
 69 Id. at 623. 
 70 Id. at 626–28. 
 71 Id. at 628. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 629–30. 
 74 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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involved in drug interdiction, (2) carry a firearm, or (3) handle classified 
materials.75 Applying the same balancing test as in Skinner, Justice Kennedy 
noted that, in certain contexts, “the Government’s need to discover . . . latent or 
hidden conditions, or to prevent their development,” alone, justifies the 
application of the special needs doctrine.76 The government’s interest in 
ensuring the fitness, integrity, and judgment of the individuals on the front line 
of drug interdiction justified the search of those individuals, even absent 
individualized suspicion.77 The Court also found that the public should not be 
forced to bear the risk of a drug-impaired agent gaining entry to a position 
where he would carry a firearm.78 
Against the weighty government interest in drug testing these two classes 
of employees, the court weighed the employees’ diminished expectation of 
privacy.79 When successful performance of an employee’s duties depends on 
judgment and dexterity, that employee could not reasonably expect 
information bearing on those qualities to remain completely protected.80 As to 
these employees, the Court found that the Customs Service’s drug testing 
policy was reasonable, even absent a history of wrongdoing by employees.81 
The Von Raab Court did, however, express doubts as to the third category 
of employees. Though it had an interest that justified the testing of those who 
handled classified information, the Customs Service had cast its net too 
broadly.82 The case was remanded for development of the record to determine 
whether all covered employees—including animal caretakers and 
accountants—would actually come into contact with classified information 
and, accordingly, whether drug testing those individuals could ever serve the 
need to protect classified information.83 
The Court faced its most recent workplace drug testing case eight years 
later in Chandler v. Miller and appeared, at least on the surface, to finally rein 
in the special needs exception.84 A Georgia statute conditioned candidacy for 
 
 75 Id. at 660–61; id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 76 Id. at 668 (majority opinion). 
 77 Id. at 668–70, 677. 
 78 Id. at 670–72. 
 79 Id. at 672. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 674, 677. 
 82 Id. at 677–78; see also LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10.3(e), at 147. 
 83 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 678. 
 84 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
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state office on a laboratory’s certification that the candidate passed a drug 
test.85 Libertarian Party nominees, upset with the mandate, filed suit.86 After 
acknowledging that the method of testing was not overly intrusive, the Court 
concentrated on what it considered the core issue: Was there a special need for 
the testing?87 In declaring the statute unconstitutional, Justice Ginsburg 
determined that nothing in the record identified either a demonstrated problem 
of drug abuse among officials or a safety risk that was “real and not simply 
hypothetical.”88 The Court also criticized the statute as ineffective at deterring 
drug use—the candidates knew when they would be tested and could simply 
abstain from drug use to avoid detection.89 
The Chandler Court further distinguished its earlier drug testing cases by 
noting that public officials “are subject to relentless scrutiny—by their peers, 
the public, and the press.”90 This attention offered a far greater protection 
against potential safety risks than was present in typical work environments.91 
Emphasizing the fundamental nature of safety risks to the Customs positions in 
Von Raab, the Court determined that the Georgia legislature sought to promote 
an image, not a compelling safety interest—that the asserted need was 
“symbolic, not ‘special.’”92 The pursuit of such a need through drug testing 
violated the Fourth Amendment.93 
On two occasions, the Court has addressed whether the government could, 
based on a safety interest, drug test not only its employees but also participants 
in uniquely governmental settings.94 Two years prior to Chandler, the Court 
 
 85 Id. at 309. 
 86 Id. at 310. 
 87 Id. at 318. 
 88 Id. at 319. 
 89 Id. at 320. 
 90 Id. at 321. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 321–22. In their brief and at oral argument, attorneys identified the purpose of the statute as 
ensuring that officials “have what it takes to exercise their best judgment,” without pointing to specific risks 
posed by a public official’s drug use. Appellees’ Brief at 15, Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(No. 95-8230); Chandler v. Miller, OYEZ PROJECT, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/ 
1996/1996_96_126 (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) (follow “Chandler v. Miller—Oral Argument” hyperlink). 
 93 See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322 (“However well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia has devised 
diminishes personal privacy for a symbol’s sake. The Fourth Amendment shields society against that state 
action.”). 
 94 See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10.3(e), at 158 n.300. The Supreme Court also evaluated a state 
hospital’s policy of drug testing its pregnant patients in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2002). 
The Court found that policy unconstitutional because the immediate objective of the search was to generate 
evidence for law enforcement purposes, which situated the hospital’s policy outside of the closely guarded 
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looked at a challenge to an Oregon school district’s student drug testing policy 
in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.95 Though Skinner and Von Raab had 
earlier permitted suspicionless testing in the post-accident and pre-employment 
contexts, Acton presented the Court with its first truly random drug testing 
scheme.96 The policy required that all athletes be tested at the beginning of the 
season and that 10% of the athletes be tested at random each week of the 
season.97 Failed tests resulted in a choice between an assistance program and 
suspension from athletics.98 
The Acton Court began by noting that special needs inhered in the school 
context99 and then added that the students subjected to testing had a diminished 
expectation of privacy because of the custodial and tutelary duties of the 
school, the voluntary choice to try out for a team, and the communal nature of 
locker rooms.100 Critical to the decision to uphold the policy was the 
significant interest in deterring drug use among children during their formative 
years—an interest the Court viewed as more powerful than that present in any 
of its prior drug testing cases.101 The Court concluded by noting that the role-
model effect of athletes’ drug use was effectively curbed by the random drug 
testing policy.102 Considering each of these factors, the Court found that the 
random drug testing policy was reasonable.103 
In the 2002 decision of Board of Education v. Earls, the Court returned to 
the issue of student drug testing to address “nightmarish images of out-of-
control flatware, livestock run amok, and colliding tubas.”104 An Oklahoma 
school district had implemented a policy requiring the drug testing of all 
students participating in extracurricular activities, including the Future 
Homemakers of America, the Future Farmers of America, the choir, and the 
cheerleading squad.105 Applying the special needs balancing test, Justice 
 
category of special needs cases. Id. at 83–84. Given that Ferguson did not turn on the sufficiency of the 
purported safety interests but on the policy’s law enforcement purpose, its implications largely fall outside of 
this Comment’s scope. 
 95 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 96 LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10.3(e), at 158. 
 97 Acton, 515 U.S. at 650. 
 98 Id. at 651. 
 99 Id. at 653 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985)). 
 100 Id. at 655–57. 
 101 Id. at 661–62. 
 102 Id. at 663. 
 103 Id. at 664–65. 
 104 536 U.S. 822, 852 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 105 Id. at 826 (majority opinion). 
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Thomas emphasized that the Court’s decision in Acton did not turn on the 
diminished expectation of privacy athletes had in their lockers; rather, the 
Court “considered the school context ‘[c]entral’ and ‘[t]he most significant 
element.’”106 Within this context, the state’s unique responsibility for 
maintaining discipline, health, and safety limited the privacy interests of 
students.107 The Court noted that the urine-collecting process was “minimally 
intrusive” and that the results were kept confidential.108 
Against this minimal privacy intrusion, the Court weighed the 
government’s important and immediate interest in preventing and deterring 
childhood drug use.109 The safety interest furthered by the scheme was 
substantial, given the health risks that drug use presents for all children.110 
Finally, random drug testing was a reasonably effective means of deterring and 
detecting drug use.111 Accordingly, the Court held that the special need to 
prevent drug use among students justified the particular testing scheme112—
and arguably one that would reach all students.113 
The Supreme Court’s drug testing cases have provided lower courts with a 
couple of guidelines. First, a special need for drug testing likely does not exist 
unless there is a government-enabled safety risk that the testing would address. 
Second, absent abuses in the collection or information-retention processes, the 
existence of a special need will inevitably tilt the reasonableness balance in 
favor of the government as long as the drug testing policy actually serves the 
 
 106 Id. at 831 n.3 (alterations in original) (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 654, 665). 
 107 Id. at 830. 
 108 Id. at 833–34. 
 109 Id. at 834–36. 
 110 Id. at 836–37. 
 111 Id. at 837. 
 112 Id. at 830. 
 113 Professor LaFave has explained why the Earls decision could eventually lead to the drug testing of all 
public school students, not just those involved in extracurricular activities: 
[I]t could . . . be that those who believe that Earls opens the door to testing all students will turn 
out to be correct. There will be great pressure not to continue the constitutional limits on student 
drug testing as stated in Earls, for the result is a testing policy that is nothing short of absurd. 
Testing would be limited to those least likely to be using drugs, and the impact of testing only 
that group would be to discourage those actually using drugs from instead spending their time 
with a worthwhile extracurricular activity. 
LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10.11(c), at 529 (footnote omitted). In some respects, the expansion of drug testing to 
all students has already begun. See Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624 (N.J. 
2003) (finding constitutional, under the special needs exception, the random drug testing of all students who 
held parking passes). 
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need.114 Yet, between the poles set by Chandler and the other drug testing 
cases, a vast expanse of ambiguity remains, leaving lower courts to argue over 
what constitutes a sufficiently “special” safety interest and when that interest is 
actually furthered. The following Part enters the debate, suggesting an 
analytical framework to provide greater consistency within special needs 
jurisprudence. 
II. FILLING THE SPECIAL NEEDS GAPS 
The Court’s special needs jurisprudence leaves two lingering questions: 
First, at what point is safety sufficiently at stake to create a special need? 
Second, what role does the efficacy inquiry—functionally part of the 
reasonableness balance,115 but typically only mentioned in the Court’s opinions 
in passing—play in the analysis? Indeed, the answer to the first question is 
outcome determinative: if a special need exists, the balance will almost always 
tilt in favor of the government interest;116 if not, the search violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Accordingly, resolving these two questions is critical to a more 
principled special needs analysis. Section A begins by identifying three 
factors—three indicia of “specialness”—that establish the existence of a 
special need to act in the interest of public safety, focusing on the nature of the 
particular context at issue and the unique risks that the context presents. 
Section B fixes the efficacy analysis on means of social control in 
organizational settings, discussing how and in what circumstances sanctioning 
mechanisms, both formal and informal, help purge the threat posed by 
employee drug use. 
 
 114 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992) (“The Supreme Court’s generalized ‘reasonableness’ standard resembles not 
negligence, but rational-basis constitutional review: when the standard applies, the government wins, save 
perhaps for a few egregious cases.”). 
 115 See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
 116 See Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Public Schools Have a “Special Need” for Their Students’ Urine, 31 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 303, 307 (2002) (“[O]ne of the difficulties of the special needs cases is that the result seems 
to depend on the answer to the front-end question—is there a special need? If the need is viewed as special, 
which it usually is, the balancing always tilts toward the government.”). Of course, the balance could still tilt 
in favor of the government if the search occasions an exceptional intrusion on privacy beyond the norm for 
drug testing schemes (e.g., through dissemination of information to third parties uninvolved in the collection 
process). This Comment’s analysis assumes that a drug testing policy contains no such exceptional 
characteristics and serves no law enforcement purpose. 
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A. Identifying a Special Need 
The greatest difficulty lower courts face in applying the special needs 
analysis rests in the front-end assessment of whether a special need for the 
particular search even exists. When the special need is public safety, courts 
addressing drug testing policies in new settings must attempt to delineate 
between a symbolic and special need. Though the initial instinct may be to 
search for an objective minimum magnitude of harm—a categorical rule that 
extends special needs protection to the government only once a set level of risk 
is identified—such an approach is inconsistent with the purposes that the 
Fourth Amendment is meant to serve. As Justice Scalia wrote of the special 
needs balancing test in Acton: 
It is a mistake . . . to think that the phrase “compelling state interest,” 
in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum 
quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case 
by answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state 
interest here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest that appears 
important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of 
other factors that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a 
genuine expectation of privacy.117 
Justice Scalia’s language clarifies that the special needs analysis involves a 
profoundly contextual inquiry. Without probing into the nature of the setting in 
which the harm arises, a court lacks an understanding of the very factors that 
make the competing interests meaningful. So, too, in the front-end “special 
need” designation,118 a court should not with myopic focus search simply for a 
particular severity of harm but instead ask whether the characteristics of the 
setting in which the harm arises create a need. 
A series of examples clarifies the important role context plays in the 
recognition of a special need. Take, first, the government’s interest in effective 
drug interdiction. The potential risks created by impaired judgment of Customs 
officers on the front lines are fundamentally different and weightier than those 
 
 117 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). 
 118 Professor Irene Merker Rosenberg has pointed out that the “special need” designation is little more 
than the recognition of the compelling government interest that is subsequently balanced. See Rosenberg, 
supra note 116, at 307 (“Conceptually, it appears in these cases that the governmental interest is counted 
twice—once to determine if the need is special, and then again in the balancing of governmental and private 
interests. The double dipping must result in a governmental win unless the search is extremely intrusive.”). 
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created by a politician drafting legislation.119 Or consider the government’s 
interest in preventing adolescent drug use. This interest may justify special 
intrusions in the school setting,120 but the government’s interest may be muted 
outside the schoolhouse gates, where it does not maintain the same supervisory 
and custodial duties.121 Context creates a given risk, defines its scope, and 
determines the frequency with which it is faced. And so, context serves as the 
backdrop of the special needs inquiry. As the safety inquiry orients itself 
around considerations of context, three factors should guide a court in the 
finding of a special need: (1) the risk addressed must be uniquely enabled by 
the particular government institution or instrumentality occasioning the search, 
(2) the safety risk must touch an essential aspect of the context in which the 
need arises, and (3) the context must be such that current controls are 
insufficient to identify and correct risk-creating activity before any harm 
occurs. This section addresses each of these factors in turn. 
First, for a special need to exist, the safety risk at issue must be uniquely 
enabled by the particular institution or instrumentality that creates the 
purported need.122 In short, a court must ask whether the ordinary public would 
face the same risk had the particular institution or instrumentality occasioning 
the search never come into being. The operation of motor vehicles on state 
roads illustrates the implications of this limit. In funding and constructing its 
roads, a state constructs an instrument through which the public faces harms 
that would not otherwise exist. As a result, a state’s interest in curbing drunk 
driving would justify the state’s implementation of sobriety checkpoints on 
those roads.123 However, an employee driving his car from office to office does 
not create a risk that rises above this baseline. Accordingly, the possibility that 
an employee might cause harm does not create a safety interest that is in any 
way “special”—all drivers pose the same risk, regardless of their 
 
 119 Compare Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668–70 (1989) (finding a special 
need for testing Customs officers involved in drug interdiction), with Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 
(1997) (finding that the possible jeopardizing of antidrug law enforcement efforts by public official drug use 
was not a special need). 
 120 See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. 822; Acton, 515 U.S. 646. 
 121 See, e.g., Lanier v. City of Woodburn, 518 F.3d 1147, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding 
unconstitutional the drug testing of part-time library pages, who exercised no in loco parentis responsibilities, 
when the purported need was protecting children from drug use). 
 122 See Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology for “Special 
Needs” Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 476 (2000). 
 123 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of 
random sobriety checkpoints under the special needs exception). 
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employment.124 But the situation would change if, by virtue of his 
employment, an individual was required to operate a school bus or other heavy 
machinery.125 The average citizen does not have the ability to operate such 
vehicles, and those vehicles present a substantial risk to life far greater than 
that posed by everyday passenger vehicles.126 
This initial limit prevents the special needs exception from swallowing the 
Fourth Amendment whole; if the exception were to reach universal risks, the 
general citizenry would face the possibility of suspicionless drug testing for 
their daily activities, and the special needs exception would become little more 
than a modern-day general warrant. For a safety risk to form the basis for a 
special need, it must present a unique, institutionally enabled risk, one created 
by context and specific to the individuals who are part of it—the railway 
operation in Skinner, the drug-interdiction responsibilities and mandated 
firearm possession in Von Raab, or the school setting in Vernonia and Earls. 
Second, a court should assess whether the safety interest goes to the 
essence of the position and setting at issue.127 So long as the safety interest 
does so, acting as an almost definitional aspect of the day-to-day functions, the 
risk is real. If the risk of harm is merely peripheral, that risk is insufficient to 
present a special need. The question that must be answered, then, is whether 
the safety risk is necessarily present whenever an employee performs his 
everyday tasks and obligations. Skinner presented a real safety risk insofar as 
railway employment is predicated upon the performance of functions that 
affect safe operation of rail lines.128 Similarly, one could not conceive of the 
Customs officials tested in Von Raab performing their jobs without engaging 
 
 124 See id. at 475. 
 125 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1279 v. Cambria Cnty. Transit Auth., 691 F. Supp. 898, 
904 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (upholding the routine drug testing of a municipal transportation authority’s bus drivers 
because they “bear direct and daily responsibilities for more lives than any other type of public employee” and 
because, given that each bus carried up to seventy passengers, “[a]n impaired driver . . . could injure or kill 
scores of people”). 
 126 See id. 
 127 The second threshold inquiry may fairly be viewed as a neo-Aristotelian extension of the essence–
accidents distinction. See generally ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 60–63, 100–01 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 
Peripatetic Press 1979) (c. 350 BCE) (distinguishing between a person’s essence and accidents). In his 
classical account, Aristotle set forth the following inquiry: Would a man who is white cease being a man if he 
were no longer white? Id. at 63. No, he reasoned, because whiteness was a property accidental to being a man, 
not one of the higher order qualities that made up man’s essence. Id. 
 128 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (“Employees subject to the tests 
discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have 
disastrous consequences.”). 
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in interdiction efforts that posed far-reaching safety consequences.129 And the 
Court permitted student drug testing after acknowledging that schools would 
cease to operate effectively if they failed to exercise their custodial duties over 
children.130 In contrast, Georgia’s purported interest in Chandler merely fell 
into the “‘set a good example’ genre,”131 given that the defendant did not 
pinpoint any unique, concrete risk presented by the drug use of candidates for 
public office.132 Identifying an individual as portraying some undesirable 
personal example ultimately says little of his ability to perform the functions of 
public office effectively and so represents a characteristic outside the scope of 
the office’s essential functions.133 When the identified need is predicated on 
the occurrence of an act that an employee is under no obligation to perform or 
on a character trait that an employee can effectively function without, it is 
sufficiently remote that a special need should not be found. 
Finally, the context within which the risk arises must be such that it is 
incapable of identifying and correcting the harm-creating activity before the 
effects are felt by the public. This final factor assures that there is actually a 
need for the particular search. The Chandler Court identified a “telling 
difference” between Georgia’s mandate for drug testing public officials and the 
earlier schemes that the Court had upheld: public officials are subject to far 
more extensive scrutiny than are employees in ordinary work environments.134 
As the ACLU pointed out in its role as amicus curiae: 
[B]ecause of numerous checks and balances on their acts, elected 
officials cannot “cause great human loss before any signs of 
impairment become noticeable to . . . others.” For example, members 
of the Georgia General Assembly cannot act alone. Elected officials 
within the executive branch must answer to the Governor. Actions of 
the executive branch (including those of the Governor) are carefully 
scrutinized by the press and the General Assembly. Judges are 
 
 129 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669 (1989) (“Many of the Service’s 
employees are often exposed to this criminal element and to the controlled substances it seeks to smuggle into 
the country.”). 
 130 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–31 (2002) (noting the significance of the school’s 
obligation to protect children). 
 131 See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997). 
 132 See id. at 321–22 (“[Public] officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and the 
required certification immediately aids no interdiction effort.”). 
 133 See Nik Antovich, Politicians’ Private Lives Indicative of Character, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 2:53 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/27/politics/uwire/main4130497.shtml (indicating that many 
individuals are unconcerned with a politician’s private life, so long as she does not cause a direct negative 
effect on their lives). 
 134 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321. 
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subject to discipline, impeachment and, in many cases, reversal on 
appeal.135 
Ordinary work environments typically lack similar protective checks for the 
actions of employees;136 the relative independence of employees and the 
immediacy with which harmful effects are felt within the ordinary workplace 
distinguish the run-of-the-mill case from Chandler. A special need to address 
safety risks should only exist when there are no unique contextual factors, such 
as those present in Chandler, that provide the opportunity for the government 
body to identify and correct the harm-creating activity before its effects are 
felt. 
When it comes to special needs, context matters.137 Indeed, for drug testing, 
context is often determinative.138 The following section explores when the 
finding of a special need may not be determinative for upholding a drug testing 
scheme. 
B. Evaluating Efficacy 
For the special needs balance to tilt in favor of a government intrusion, not 
only must the implementing body base its search on a special need, it must also 
show that the particular search is actually designed to serve that need.139 When 
it has addressed the issue, the Supreme Court has only done so in cursory 
fashion,140 leaving few standards to which lower courts can look for guidance. 
In large part, the underdevelopment of the efficacy prong is a result of the 
Court having not yet encountered a suspicionless-search program where the 
record placed efficacy squarely in question—that is, where a program was not 
clearly oriented toward the advancement of the purported need.141 
 
 135 Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 9–10, Chandler, 520 U.S. 305 (No. 96-
126) (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 628 (1989)). 
 136 See, e.g., Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 137 Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps.—IAM v. Vilsack, 681 F.3d 483, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 138 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 139 See LAFAVE, supra note 9, § 10.3(e), at 159 (“[A] drug testing scheme . . . may be found wanting as a 
Fourth Amendment matter because that scheme does not effectively serve the legitimate goals of detection and 
deterrence.”). 
 140 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629. Although Skinner did present a case with at least a low level of 
deterrence, the scheme in question had a clearer benefit in its ability to incapacitate violators. 
 141 Though the Von Raab Court expressed concern about the Custom Service’s seemingly overbroad drug 
testing of individuals who handled classified information, it remanded the case for further development of the 
record. 489 U.S. 656, 678 (1989). 
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This section fleshes out the Court’s brief nods to efficacy into a complete 
analytical framework applicable to all forms of suspicionless drug testing. 
Following the Court’s lead, this framework maps the traditional utilitarian 
theories of criminal punishment—deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation142—onto the efficacy prong of the special needs analysis. This 
orientation places the focus squarely on the necessity of implementing a 
meaningful sanctioning mechanism if a special need is to be served. In the 
process, this section identifies the particular social controls, whether formal or 
informal, that one should expect to see at work in permissible drug testing 
regimes.143 This section now discusses each theory of punishment in turn. 
1. Deterrence 
Deterrence theory posits that an individual evaluates the net value of 
deviant behavior by weighing the potential gain against the perceived certainty, 
severity, and swiftness of repercussions.144 The theory proposes two arguments 
about human action: (1) man accurately perceives the costs and benefits of his 
actions, and (2) man acts rationally, through conformity or deviance, according 
to that perception.145 For an individual to choose to forego deviant behavior, he 
must actually perceive a threat of punishment.146 
To understand the role of deterrence in organizational settings, one must 
first acknowledge the baseline by which society, as a whole, acts. And that 
baseline is set through the broad-reaching, established rules that apply to all 
society—the criminal law. Behavioral theorists have long studied how the 
certainty and severity of sanctions enforced through the law impact an 
 
 142 See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s 
Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2003) (discussing the prevailing theories 
of punishment). 
 143 For purposes of exposition, this Part discusses the operation of theories of social control and utilitarian 
theories of punishment primarily within workplace drug testing schemes. The general principles underlying 
these theories may, to varying degrees, be applied to special needs searches in other contexts, depending on the 
unique contextual factors implicated. 
 144 Monica J. Barratt et al., Cannabis Law Reform in Western Australia: An Opportunity to Test Theories 
of Marginal Deterrence and Legitimacy, 24 DRUG & ALCOHOL REV. 321, 322 (2005); Uri Gneezy & Aldo 
Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2000). 
 145 Michael Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence, Overload, and Incapacitation: An Empirical 
Evaluation, 56 SOC. FORCES 424, 425 (1977). 
 146 See, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 
CRIME & JUST. 1, 18 (1998) (“[A]bsent some linkage between policy and perceptions[, ]behavior is immune to 
policy manipulation.” (citation omitted)). 
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individual’s decision to engage in or forego a criminal act.147 A collection of 
cognitive biases, they have found, leads the criminal to the conclusion that he 
is unlikely to be caught and that, if caught, he would only receive the minimum 
punishment.148 Because of this perceived low risk of detection, criminal 
sanctions often create a low deterrent effect for the general populace,149 
particularly when those sanctions target illicit drug use.150 Given the expected 
immediate rewards of drug use and its addictive qualities, the uncertain and 
remote nature of legal sanctions provide little incentive for a criminal to halt 
his drug use.151 But, as a general matter, one should expect that the formal 
legal system deters at least some portion of society from ever using drugs. 
The Court’s drug testing cases implicitly adopt this understanding of the 
criminal law’s normative effects as a jumping-off point when approaching the 
question of deterrence. When searching for a deterrent effect, then, what a 
court is looking for is marginal deterrence. That is, the program implemented 
must contain sufficient enforcement mechanisms to deter individuals who 
would not be deterred by the criminal law alone. Accordingly, institutions must 
create external incentives that define the acceptable boundaries of individual 
behavior. As Andrew Oldenquist has observed, “[H]umans evolved to be 
innately social animals, to be tribal creatures and group egoists who are 
emotionally dependent on group membership.”152 Individual mental models are 
not universally shared, varying instead according to the unique environments 
 
 147 See, e.g., Geerken & Gove, supra note 145, at 425 (“[P]resent evidence indicates that certainty is more 
important than severity of punishment in deterring crime.” (citation omitted)). 
 148 See Matthew Haist, Comment, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: Are Utilitarian Goals 
Achievable in a World of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 789, 809–14 (2009) 
(listing cognitive biases and ultimately concluding that “the criminal probably does not believe that he or she 
will be caught in the first place” and that, “if he or she is caught, he or she will believe that he will receive a 
sentence or punishment on the lower end of the range of permissible punishments”). 
 149 Geerken & Gove, supra note 145, at 428; see also Irving Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and 
Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 114 (1986). 
 150 See Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 502 (1993) (“It is doubtful . . . that the criminal justice system could ever mete out 
punishment for drug offenses rapidly enough to counteract impulsivity effects without greatly curtailing civil 
liberties.”). 
 151 Id. at 501–02. 
 152 Andrew Oldenquist, Community and De-Alienation, in ALIENATION, COMMUNITY, AND WORK 91, 92 
(Andrew Oldenquist & Menachem Rosner eds., 1991); accord id. at 96 (“Human beings are not bugs who 
mechanically catch the[ir] prey and spin their cocoons as their DNA directs them; we are more complex 
creatures whose innate behavior works through wants, fears, and external sources of satisfaction and 
anxiety.”). 
MCKINLEY GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:37 PM 
2012] TESTING OUR TEACHERS 1517 
and institutions of which each individual is a part.153 Building on these 
background principles, a number of scholars have acknowledged the 
controlling effect of norms within relatively small, well-defined social 
constructs, such as the family, peer group, or workplace.154 These constructs 
present unique informal and formal influences on member behavior.155 
Informally, these settings engender feelings of social connectedness, raising 
the social costs of transgression.156 Individuals value the opinions of those with 
whom they share social bonds and, accordingly, orient their actions to avoid 
stigma and embarrassment.157 Formally, these institutions encourage the 
development of clearly promulgated behavioral rules with well-known 
sanctions.158 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the institutional setting in controlling 
individual behavior is its ability to deliver a clear message to members.159 
Closed systems enable more informed assessment of social-control 
mechanisms, benefitting from the unique advantages of known members, 
distinct spatial boundaries, formal rules, well-known sanctions, and efficient 
informational avenues.160 As the reach of the sanctioning scheme narrows, 
 
 153 See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 
91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 487 (1985) (“Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context . . . .”); 
Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 18 (John Harris et al. eds., 1995) (“[Mental 
models] are acquired through experience which is ‘local’ to the particular environment and therefore also 
varies widely with different environments.”). 
 154 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); 
Robert Apel et al., The Sanctions–Perceptions Link in a Model of School-Based Deterrence, 25 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 201, 205 (2009); Victor Nee & Paul Ingram, Embeddedness and Beyond: 
Institutions, Exchange, and Social Structure, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY 19 (Mary C. 
Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 1998). 
 155 See Apel et al., supra note 154, at 206, 220 (identifying stigma and well-known sanctions as factors 
influencing individual behavior within institutions). 
 156 See, e.g., id. at 206; Granovetter, supra note 153, at 490 (“The embeddedness argument stresses . . . the 
role of concrete personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust and 
discouraging malfeasance.”). 
 157 Apel et al., supra note 154, at 206; see also ROBERT S. BARON & NORBERT L. KERR, GROUP PROCESS, 
GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION 64–66 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing conformity pressure as a control on 
individual action, particularly where an individual values the group); Nee & Ingram, supra note 154, at 28–29 
(noting that, through the “publish-or-perish” norm in the research-university setting, colleagues confer social 
approval and informally rank faculty members according to their perception of the members’ academic 
productivity and that, as a result, the motivation for research productivity is based not merely on monetary 
concerns but also on a desire for social approval and status). 
 158 Apel et al., supra note 154, at 220. 
 159 Id. at 207. 
 160 Id. at 220. 
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thereby making the possibility of punishment more palpable to the individual, 
the effectiveness of the sanctioning climate strengthens.161 Where broad-
reaching criminal laws have failed to produce a deterrent result,162 similar 
efforts in smaller pockets of social control may prove beneficial. 
As noted above, one institution in which we should expect social-control 
mechanisms to exert a unique influence on individual behavior is the 
workplace. Apart from the need for a steady income, many people look 
forward to going to work each day because, given the substantial amount of 
time spent in the workplace, that is where many of their closest friends are.163 
For most adults, relationships at work are the most meaningful ones outside of 
the family unit, and many workers view good relationships with coworkers as a 
working condition of great import.164 So, it is not surprising that social 
scientists find that interactions with coworkers create a strong feeling of 
community for many individuals165—a feeling, we would expect, that not 
many would easily give up. 
A series of studies evaluating drug testing schemes in the workplace have 
confirmed the belief that the workplace creates unique normative effects on 
individual behavior.166 Individuals whose employers perform drug testing are 
substantially less likely to use drugs than those individuals whose employers 
do not.167 The mere presence of these testing policies increases the necessity of 
abstaining completely from drug use, given the extensive length of time that 
 
 161 See, e.g., id. at 221 (“[T]he association between changes in sanctioning climate and perceived risk was 
strongest among youth in the smallest and least disordered schools.”). 
 162 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he county may be too large and diffuse a geographic unit of aggregation to find 
evidence for a sanctions–perceptions correlation.”). 
 163 JAMES O’TOOLE & EDWARD E. LAWLER III, THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE 134 (2006). 
 164 Id. at 133. 
 165 Id. at 134. 
 166 See, e.g., Christopher S. Carpenter, Workplace Drug Testing and Worker Drug Use, 42 HEALTH 
SERVICES RES. 795, 805 & tbl.4 (2007) (finding, in the employment setting, a high correlation between penalty 
severity and deterrent effect); John P. Hoffmann & Cindy L. Larison, Worker Drug Use and Workplace Drug-
Testing Programs: Results from the 1994 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, 26 CONTEMP. DRUG 
PROBS. 331, 347 (1999) (“The[] results suggest that workplace drug-testing programs attenuate frequent use of 
these drugs.” (citation omitted)); see also Worker Drug Use and Workplace Policies and Programs: Results 
from the 1994 and 1997 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, http://oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/A-11/WrkplcPlcy2-34.htm#P4114_76969 (last updated Dec. 30, 2008) 
(“[W]orkers who were not current illicit drug users were significantly more likely to report that their 
employers had drug use testing programs . . . than workers who were current illicit drug users.”). 
 167 See Carpenter, supra note 166, at 805 tbl.4 (finding that individuals tested pre-hire were .715 times as 
likely to report past-month marijuana use as those whose employers did not perform testing, individuals tested 
at random were .721 times as likely, and individuals tested both pre-hire and at random were .444 times as 
likely). 
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trace amounts of drugs may remain in an individual’s urine.168 Studies have 
found that, as the severity of punishment increases, the likelihood of an 
employee using drugs decreases.169 For example, one study found that 
individuals were .56 times as likely to report that they had used drugs when the 
penalty for a failed test was termination, .71 times as likely when the penalty 
was compulsory entry into a rehabilitation program, and .88 times as likely 
when the penalty was of lesser magnitude.170 Consistent with this finding, a 
study of the Navy’s “Zero Tolerance” drug testing policy revealed that the 
policy deterred 56.5% of drug use among Navy personnel.171 
These findings reflect the interplay of the two forms of social control 
described above—formal and informal—in creating the deterrent effect of a 
particular drug testing scheme. At bottom, for a drug testing scheme to be an 
effective deterrent, it must employ formal sanctioning mechanisms—that is, 
there must be an articulated policy with certain punishments. Where the risk is 
greatest, as when the sanction is termination, the formal sanction does much of 
the work; for many, the economic risk of unemployment will deter drug use. 
Informal controls exert influence when termination is a possibility as well, 
given that a failed drug test results in total exclusion from a significant social 
group. But as the studies above show, even as the severity of the formal 
sanction—and the potential economic loss—to the individual decreases, a 
deterrent effect may remain.172 For these lesser sanctions, such as forced entry 
into a rehabilitation program, informal sanctions come to the fore. Absent a 
meaningful economic impact, an individual’s decision to cease or refrain from 
drug use is best conceptualized as a desire to avoid a sanction that clearly 
labels the individual as a “drug user” to his coworkers, creating a risk of stigma 
and outsider status.173 
 
 168 See Scott Macdonald et al., Testing for Cannabis in the Work-Place: A Review of the Evidence, 105 
ADDICTION 408, 409 (2010) (“The detection periods (i.e. the time between the ingestion of a drug and a 
positive test) vary considerably for different drugs: 2 days for morphine, 3–5 days for cocaine and up to 
several weeks for cannabis.”). 
 169 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 166, at 805. 
 170 Id. at 805 tbl.4. 
 171 Jules I. Borack, An Estimate of the Impact of Drug Testing on the Deterrence of Drug Use, 10 
MILITARY PSYCHOL. 17, 24 (1998). The Navy instituted a random drug testing scheme that drew samples from 
10% to 30% of all personnel annually. Id. at 17. 
 172 See Carpenter, supra note 166, at 805 tbl.4. 
 173 See BARON & KERR, supra note 157, at 66 (“People conform more when . . . [t]heir conformity or 
deviation will be easily identifiable (and therefore subject to social rewards and punishments) . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
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Whether a given drug testing scheme has a deterrent effect thus depends on 
the scheme’s triggering event and the particular punishments that result from a 
failed test. The first—and least problematic—form of suspicionless drug 
testing is the pre-employment scheme.174 Employers typically implement these 
schemes to ferret out employees entering safety-sensitive positions before they 
ever have the opportunity to cause harm.175 Such tests are used as part of the 
hiring process and apply to all individuals seeking to occupy safety-sensitive 
positions.176 These schemes serve a clear deterrent purpose. The inclusion of a 
tangible formal sanction—the denial of employment—and the uncertainty with 
which an employer will act on an application prevents many drug users from 
ever applying to the position.177 The exceedingly high likelihood of a failed 
drug test is sufficient to deter applicants, even though informal social controls 
are muted by the individual’s lack of connectedness within the work 
environment. 
The second (and most controversial) form of suspicionless drug testing is 
the random scheme.178 Random drug testing schemes select employees for 
testing “by a method employing objective, neutral criteria which ensure that 
every covered employee has a substantially equal statistical chance of being 
selected within a specified time frame.”179 Employers spread testing and 
selection procedures over the course of the calendar year to maximize the 
deterrent effect of the testing.180 The number of employees selected for testing 
each year is determined according to a minimum percentage of the workforce 
set by the policy.181 
 
 174 Jill Dorancy-Williams, Comment, The Difference Between Mine and Thine: The Constitutionality of 
Public Employee Drug Testing, 28 N.M. L. REV. 451, 469 (1998); cf. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 275 
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e always have viewed notice and the opportunity to decline as beneficial aspects of a 
suspicionless search regime because those features minimize intrusiveness.”). 
 175 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 219.502(a)(1)–(2) (2011) (noting that the FRA’s pre-employment testing applies 
to those who engage in safety-sensitive functions). 
 176 See, e.g., id. § 219.502(a)(2)–(3). 
 177 See LARSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 (noting that 5.6 million workers reported that they would be 
less likely to work for an employer conducting pre-employment drug testing). 
 178 Dorancy-Williams, supra note 174, at 477. 
 179 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 219.601(b)(1) (FRA policy). Subjective factors should play no role in selection. 
See id. 
 180 See, e.g., id. § 219.601(b)(2)(i)(A) (“The random testing program is spread reasonably through the 12-
month period.”). 
 181 See, e.g., id. § 219.602(a) (“[T]he minimum annual percentage rate for random drug testing must be 50 
percent of covered employees.”); Borack, supra note 171, at 17 (requiring random urinalysis of 10% to 30% of 
all Navy personnel without permission from higher headquarters). 
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Within this category of testing, again, a deterrent effect should be expected. 
Such programs assure that a substantial portion of employees will be tested as 
set by the policy and that the random manner in which employees are chosen 
prevents individuals from altering their behavior only temporarily to pass a 
test. Because an employer would only have the incentive to expend the 
resources necessary to support a random drug testing policy if a meaningful 
employment sanction resulted—whether termination, suspension, or compelled 
entry into a rehabilitation program—we should expect to see the interplay 
between formal and informal sanctions discussed above.182 When the sanction 
imposed threatens either to permanently remove the individual from the work 
community or to result in a punishment that is sufficiently visible to risk the 
stigma of the peer group, those risks alone will deter a number of individuals 
from continuing or ever beginning to use drugs.183 
The final suspicionless drug testing tool is the post-incident scheme. Post-
incident testing occurs following a distinct triggering event, even though the 
employer may have no reasonable suspicion that the employee committed a 
wrongful act.184 An example is a policy that calls for drug testing of employees 
after an accident or other harm has already occurred.185 The scheme’s reliance 
on a remote triggering event lowers the certainty of punishment to the point 
where an individual is unlikely to alter his behavior in response to the 
existence of the policy. An individual’s optimism bias will lead him to believe, 
in most instances, that such events are unlikely to occur and, even if they do 
occur, are unlikely to involve him.186 For post-incident schemes, the deterrent 
effect, as a general rule, will likely be nonexistent or at least exceedingly low, 
regardless of the formal and informal sanctions that might result. 
2. Incapacitation 
Although deterrence is the broadest reaching form of punishment, it is not 
all-encompassing.187 Deterrence aims to discourage future acts, but its value is 
 
 182 See supra text accompanying notes 172–73. 
 183 See Carpenter, supra note 166, at 805 tbl.4. 
 184 See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(a) (listing train accidents, impact accidents, fatal incidents, and 
passenger accidents as triggering events for toxicological testing). 
 185 See, e.g., id. 
 186 See generally Haist, supra note 148, at 812–13 (discussing how an individual develops optimism bias 
toward crime detection). 
 187 See Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Counterterrorism, the Constitution, and the Civil–Criminal Divide: 
Evaluating the Designation of U.S. Persons Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 
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solely as a coercive measure to prevent future violations.188 Separate from this 
coercion, utilitarian goals are served through measures that respond to risks in 
a corrective manner.189 The drug testing scheme in Skinner illustrates this 
distinction. The Court’s conclusion that the FRA’s suspicionless post-accident 
drug testing policy served a preventative purpose190 is consistent with the 
earlier discussion of deterrence. The employment setting created a sense of 
social connectedness among the railway employees, and the scheme set a 
severe sanction of dismissal.191 However, the scheme provided a greater 
benefit to society than deterrence alone—a failed drug test actually resulted in 
the removal of violators from the setting, foreclosing the possibility that those 
identified as drug users might cause future harm. Though the threat of 
termination promoted the public good through deterrence, the imposition of 
that sanction independently served the aim of incapacitation.192 
Incapacitation involves a clearer evaluation of actors than deterrence—it 
requires no inquiry into the individual’s state of mind or into his subjective 
valuations of risk and reward.193 Instead, incapacitation rests on the 
government’s independent determination that the removal of a particular 
individual from a particular societal construct will improve the public good.194 
Through this removal, society renders the individual incapable of inflicting the 
harm again.195 Within the employment context, incapacitation often takes the 
form of termination. By removing the individual from the very positions which 
present opportunities for harm, an employer ensures that the risks of harm 
created by drug use are eradicated. 
For pre-employment drug testing policies, the goal of incapacitation is 
advanced insofar as all individuals who fail a drug test will invariably be 
 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 95, 118 (2011) (“[P]unishment has a great many purposes, including not just deterrence 
and retribution but also rehabilitation and prevention through incapacitation.”). 
 188 See Sigler, supra note 142, at 1155. 
 189 See, e.g., Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated 
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (“Incapacitation uses 
imprisonment to remove the offender from society to protect it from the danger he poses.”). 
 190 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1989). 
 191 See id. 
 192 See Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 465, 
468 (1961) (“[Deterrence, incapacitation, and correction] all are means to crime prevention and as such are 
entitled to be weighed.”). 
 193 See Stephen O’Hanlon, Toward a More Reasonable Approach to Free Will in Criminal Law, 7 
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 395, 420 (2009). 
 194 Id. 
 195 See Sigler, supra note 142, at 1155. 
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denied employment and, as a result, deprived of the opportunity to occupy a 
position where they might cause harm. With random and post-incident testing, 
the potential for the incapacitation of drug users rests entirely on the given 
policy’s mechanical imposition of a sanction that actually removes violators 
from the workplace setting, such as termination. So long as such a meaningful 
removal is effected through the policy, a special need will be advanced directly 
through the jettisoning of risk-creating persons and behaviors. 
3. Rehabilitation 
The final form of government action that may yield an efficacious result is 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation involves a direct attempt to reform the 
wrongdoer, transforming his character so that his behavior squares with 
accepted norms.196 Like incapacitation, rehabilitation is a reactive tool, having 
effect only after a transgressor has already been caught.197 Rehabilitation, then, 
serves a two-fold societal good: (1) it protects society from the offender, and 
(2) it enhances the offender’s own well-being.198 Although rehabilitation 
programs do not in all instances reform the wrongdoer,199 they will reform 
some, leading to a socially desirable result.200 
With straightforward denial of entrance as its purpose, a pre-employment 
drug test could not attempt to further the purpose of rehabilitation. There can 
be no attempt to reform an individual when a scheme is oriented solely toward 
the exclusion of all drug users. As with incapacitation, the presence of a 
satisfactory rehabilitative purpose in random and post-incident schemes hinges 
on the inclusion of appropriate sanctioning measures. For example, a drug 
testing policy might condition continued employment following a failed drug 
test on participation in a drug-abuse program.201 Even if the individuals are not 
permanently removed from the particular setting, the government furthers a 
 
 196 Id. at 1155–56. 
 197 See id. 
 198 Martha Grace Duncan, “Cradled on the Sea”: Positive Images of Prison and Theories of Punishment, 
76 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1243 (1988). 
 199 See O’Hanlon, supra note 193, at 419 (“[R]eliance on rehabilitation is problematic, especially if there 
are strong deterministic characteristics that exist within certain offenders.”). 
 200 See, e.g., Jane McCusker et al., Outcomes of a 21-Day Drug Detoxification Program: Retention, 
Transfer to Further Treatment, and HIV Risk Reduction, 21 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 1, 12 tbl.3 
(1995) (finding that no drug use was reported among 28% of individuals entering drug-detoxification 
programs only, 37% of those entering detoxification programs and outpatient facilities, and 49% of those 
entering detoxification and residential facilities). 
 201 Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 651 (1995) (providing athletes who failed a drug 
test with a six-week drug-assistance program). 
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safety interest through efforts to reform identified offenders to prevent future 
wrongs. 
*  *  * 
The preceding discussion has aimed to provide a measure of clarity within 
two underdeveloped areas of the special needs inquiry. First, the Part identified 
three contextual considerations that should guide a court in making the front-
end special needs determination. Given the typically outcome-determinative 
nature of this inquiry,202 these considerations offer great potential to combat 
the criticism that special needs decisions too often take on an ad hoc 
appearance. Second, this Part proposed an analytical framework for 
understanding the efficacy prong. In evaluating the effect of formal and 
informal controls on the advancement of various goals of punishment within 
different drug testing schemes, the discussion has attempted to prepare courts 
for the day when they must seriously question a search despite the presence of 
a valid need. 
III.  AN APPLICATION: TEACHER DRUG TESTING 
Part II advocated the implementation of a contextual inquiry to assess both 
the existence of a special need and the efficacy of the particular drug testing 
policy. Part III now applies these principles to the debate that opened this 
Comment: the suspicionless drug testing of public school teachers. This Part 
proceeds in three steps. First, this Part discusses the unique dangers targeted by 
teacher drug use. Second, this Part takes those unique dangers and examines 
whether they create a special need for drug testing public school teachers. 
Finally, it assesses whether the interest will be served in three forms of 
suspicionless drug testing schemes: (1) random testing, (2) pre-employment 
testing, and (3) post-incident testing.203 
A. Harms Targeted by Teacher Drug Testing 
For a school board to have a special need to drug test its teachers, that 
board must first identify the safety risks that might form the basis for the need. 
This section identifies the three most salient dangers that teachers create 
 
 202 See supra notes 114, 116. 
 203 See generally John B. Wefing, Employer Drug Testing: Disparate Judicial and Legislative Responses, 
63 ALB. L. REV. 799 (2000) (identifying instances in which an employer may choose to implement a drug 
testing scheme). 
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through their drug use: (1) decreased awareness and judgment while under the 
influence; (2) enablement, directly and indirectly, of student drug use; and (3) 
the molding of attitudes toward drug use through role modeling. 
1. Decreased Awareness and Judgment 
The first potential risk that teacher drug use presents is decreased 
awareness and judgment within the school setting. By tapping into the brain’s 
neural network, many drugs interfere with the way nerve cells send, receive, 
and process information.204 Most illicit drugs target the brain’s reward system 
with a surge of dopamine—a neurotransmitter regulating movement, emotion, 
cognition, motivation, and pleasure.205 Following this initial surge, the brain 
responds by producing less dopamine to reach equilibrium.206 For example, 
among cannabis users, this drop in dopamine levels has led to drowsiness, 
distorted vision and hearing, loss of concentration, and dream-like states.207 
Studies have also found that cannabis has effects on memory, learning, and 
other cognitive processes.208 
A teacher suffering from these incapacities threatens the maintenance of 
order in schools. Although idealized as educational safe havens, public schools 
face prevalent drug and violence problems. A 2010 Department of Health and 
Human Services study found that, in the year leading up to the survey, 22.7% 
had been offered, sold, or given drugs at school, and that, in just the prior 
month, 4.6% had smoked marijuana at school.209 The same study found that, in 
the prior year, another 11.1% of students had been in a fight on school grounds 
and that 7.7% had been either threatened with or injured by a weapon at 
school.210 Were students measured over the entirety of their educational 
experiences, these numbers would only continue to rise. Reflecting an extreme 
 
 204 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH PUB. NO. 10-5605, 
DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF ADDICTION 17 (2010), available at 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/sciofaddiction.pdf. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 19. 
 207 See, e.g., Leo E. Hollister, Health Aspects of Cannabis, 38 PHARMACOLOGICAL REVIEWS 1, 2 (1986); 
see also Macdonald et al., supra note 168, at 410 (“Reduced perceptual and motor skills, attention, decision-
making, learning and short-term memory are noted frequently as impairments. Mood changes (i.e. euphoria or 
anxiety), perception and difficulty in concentration are also reported frequently.” (endnotes omitted)). 
 208 See, e.g., Irma B. Adams & Billy R. Martin, Cannabis: Pharmacology and Toxicology in Animals and 
Humans, 91 ADDICTION 1585, 1601–02 (1996). 
 209 Danice K. Eaton et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance—United States, 2009, MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., June 4, 2010, at 1, 19, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss5905.pdf. 
 210 Id. at 7. 
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case, a Pennsylvania school district recently reported a rate of 47.23 violent 
incidents per 100 students during the 2011–2012 school year.211 Indeed, one 
does not need to look long to find stories of school violence in the news, often 
with disastrous consequences for the students involved.212 
This high incidence of illicit activity has led some states to create mandates 
for safe schools.213 California, for example, amended its state constitution to 
provide all students with “the inalienable right to attend campuses which are 
safe, secure and peaceful.”214 As the frontline of school security, teachers have 
the unique ability—and, indeed, responsibility—to curb the substantial risks 
presented within the schoolhouse gates.215 
A teacher’s drug use greatly jeopardizes his ability to ensure that these 
duties are fulfilled. Violent encounters erupt suddenly, resulting from little 
more than petty insults or wayward looks.216 Drug use and sales occur 
surreptitiously. Distorted vision and hearing, drowsiness, and loss of 
 
 211 Adam Wagner, Wilkinsburg Is Pa.’s Most Violent School District, TRIBLIVE (June 27, 2012, 12:01 
AM), http://triblive.com/news/2100160-74/district-schools-incidents-students-violence-violent-
wilkinsburg-100-per-state. 
 212 See, e.g., Chris Bury & Kristina Wong, After Chicago Teen’s Violent Death, White House Tries to 
Mitigate School Violence, ABC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/derrion-alberts-death-
obamas-education-secretary-arne-duncan/story?id=8777211#.T_Kl6lvNqSo (reciting the story of a sixteen-
year-old student bludgeoned to death in a Chicago high school by four teenagers); Columbine Students 
Attacked with Hammer at School, CBS NEWS (Feb. 13, 2012, 3:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_ 
162-57376813/columbine-students-attacked-with-hammer-at-school/ (describing a fifteen-year-old female 
student’s attack on two female classmates with a hammer at Columbine High School); Erin McLaughlin, 
School District Pays Out $4.2 Million to Student Paralyzed by Bully Attack, ABC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2012, 8:03 
PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/04/school-district-pays-out-4-2-million-to-student-
paralyzed-by-bully-attack/ (recounting how a twelve-year-old New Jersey student was paralyzed after a bully 
punched him in the abdomen, sending a blood clot to his spine); Curtis M. Wong, Kardin Ulysse, New York 
Teen, Left Blind in One Eye After Alleged Anti-Gay Attack by Bullies, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2012, 
12:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/19/kardin-ulysse-new-york-teen-blinded-gay-billies_n_ 
1609103.html (summarizing an attack on a fourteen-year-old junior high student on school grounds based on 
his perceived sexual orientation, which left the student blind in one eye); Emmeline Zhao, Warren Lewis, Teen 
in Texas School Shooting, Says He Was Bullied, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2012, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/11/teen-in-texas-school-shoo_0_n_1200385.html?ref=school-
bullying (discussing a Houston teenager who shot a classmate in the leg at school). 
 213 Gale M. Morrison et al., School Violence to School Safety: Reframing the Issue for School 
Psychologists, 23 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 236, 239 (1994). 
 214 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f)(1). 
 215 Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 375 (6th Cir. 1998); see also 
Ronald D. Stephens, Planning for Safer and Better Schools: School Violence Prevention and Intervention 
Strategies, 23 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 204, 210 (1994) (“Crime and violence is often promoted by the quality and 
preparation of staff responsible for daily supervision.”). 
 216 Gloria E. Miller, School Violence Miniseries: Impressions and Implications, 23 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 
257, 257–58 (1994). 
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concentration present serious impediments to a teacher’s ability to prevent 
harm from actually occurring in school, and to identify and react to harms once 
they are present.217 
2. Enablement of Student Drug Use 
Teachers present a second risk that is unique among forms of public 
employment—the enablement of adolescent drug use. Such drug use is a major 
public health concern. Studies have shown that, although brain size stabilizes 
by age five, myelination and synaptic pruning—processes critical to cognitive 
development—occur well into a child’s teenage years.218 Both the basal 
ganglia and frontal cortex develop relatively late, showing the continuing 
maturation of cognitive processes over the course of adolescence.219 
Accordingly, the typical school-aged child is going through a critical stage of 
development where environment and activities may shape his brain 
development220—a development upon which drug use will have a direct, 
negative impact.221 
School districts, then, should desire to close all possible avenues for 
children to obtain drugs, not the least of which is the drug-using teacher. 
Stories of teachers placing drugs directly into the hands of students arise far 
too frequently. In a Pennsylvania school district, one employee who served as 
a coach and teacher’s aide was accused of calling a student out of class to 
smoke marijuana, giving prescription pills to athletes before competitions, and 
allowing students to use drugs in his home.222 A high school debate teacher in 
a west Texas school district pled guilty to distributing narcotics to her 
 
 217 See Knox, 158 F.3d at 379 (“Clearly, if school personnel are themselves under the influence of, or 
involved in, drugs, their ability to perform this critical function [of monitoring students and preventing harm 
from occurring] is not only reduced, but they themselves are open to being compromised and undermined.”). 
 218 Lisa C. Caldwell et al., Gender and Adolescent Alcohol Use Disorders on BOLD (Blood Oxygen Level 
Dependent) Response to Spatial Working Memory, 40 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 194, 194 (2005). 
 219 Sarah Durston et al., Anatomical MRI of the Developing Human Brain: What Have We Learned?, 40 J. 
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1012, 1016 (2001). 
 220 See Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI 
Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 863 (1999). 
 221 See Ignacio Mata et al., Gyrification Brain Abnormalities Associated with Adolescence and Early-
Adulthood Cannabis Use, 1317 BRAIN RES. 297, 301 (2010) (“Our findings support recent reports of 
neuroanatomical changes associated with [cannabis] use and, for the first time, reveal that cannabis use may 
induce cortical gyrification abnormalities.”). 
 222 Douglas B. Brill, Ex-Bangor Teacher’s Aide Charged with Dealing Drugs to Students, POCONO REC. 
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.poconorecord.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100923/NEWS/9230325/-1/ 
rss01. 
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students.223 And a North Carolina English teacher was recently arrested for 
selling prescription drugs to students and employing them to sell those same 
drugs in a local high school.224 These examples are not meant to imply that 
such behavior is typical of public school teachers—it assuredly is not. Rather, 
they serve to show the unique opportunities that teachers have—and 
sometimes take—to imperil adolescent well-being by providing direct access 
to drugs that would otherwise be unavailable. 
A teacher may also enable student drug use indirectly merely by bringing 
drugs onto school grounds. For example, a teacher in a New Jersey school 
district was charged after an investigation revealed that he received the highly 
addictive drug OxyContin on school grounds as part of a one-thousand-pill-a-
week prescription drug ring that involved a group of other teachers in the 
district.225 The risk teachers like this pose is not that they voluntarily place the 
drugs in a student’s hands; rather, the mere presence of drugs on school 
grounds increases the risk to students. In such cases, the unzipping of a bag, 
opening of a desk, or unlocking of a car may stand as the sole obstacle to 
student drug possession. 
Given that drug use will often correlate with drug possession, the 
implementation of a drug testing scheme addresses the risks created by 
teachers through direct and indirect enablement. School boards should be able 
to act when the very individuals they employ have the power to dramatically 
impact childhood development. 
3. Forming Attitudes Through Role Modeling 
Unlike the previous two types of harms, the final safety risk from teacher 
drug use—negative role modeling—does not result in a tangible detriment but 
rather in one that is attitudinal. Social-learning theorists posit that an individual 
will identify with and emulate his role models and that the individual will 
 
 223 James Cannon, MISD Teacher Sentenced to 37 Months for Drug Dealing, MYWESTTEXAS.COM (Mar. 
31, 2011, 10:19 PM), http://www.mywesttexas.com/top_stories/article_0858181a-ae30-5198-a6ab-41af9d994a 
e0.html. 
 224 Laura Hibbard, Meredith Burris Pruitt, North Carolina Teacher, Allegedly Used Students to Sell 
Drugs, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2012, 8:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/03/meredith-
burris-pruitt-teacher-arrested-for-using-students-to-sell-drugs_n_1400135.html. 
 225 Michael Rispoli, Warren County Teacher, Coach Charged in Drug Ring Received Pills at School, 
Authorities Say, NJ.COM (Aug. 4, 2009, 7:33 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/08/warren_county_ 
teacher_coach_ch.html. 
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adopt and internalize the values of that role model.226 Accordingly, studies 
have found that actual and perceived drug use among influential adult figures 
is positively correlated with adolescent drug use.227 
Adolescents spend 6.5 to 8 hours per day, 32.5 to 40 hours per week, and 
over 8000 hours total within the school environment.228 Given this high level 
of daily interaction between teacher and student, teachers inevitably assume 
the mantle of role model.229 Describing the unique role of teacher as role 
model, Justice Powell wrote: 
[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle 
but important influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, 
through both the presentation of course materials and the example he 
sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students 
toward government, the political process, and a citizen’s social 
responsibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good health 
of a democracy.230 
Because of the profoundly influential role teachers play in the lives of their 
students, then, it is unsurprising that a number of states have made immorality 
a ground for termination in their teacher-tenure statutes231 and that at least one 
state has used this ground to terminate teachers for their drug-related 
behaviors.232 
This role-model function provides an additional incentive to curb teacher 
drug use.233 So long as teachers appear, through their words and actions, to 
oppose drug use, they will encourage healthy behaviors among children or, at 
 
 226 See William J. Brown & Marcela Alejandra Chaván de Matviuk, Sports Celebrities and Public Health: 
Diego Maradona’s Influence on Drug Use Prevention, 15 J. HEALTH COMM. 358, 362–63 (2010). 
 227 See, e.g., George J. Huba et al., Longitudinal Analysis of the Role of Peer Support, Adult Models, and 
Peer Subcultures in Beginning Adolescent Substance Use: An Application of Setwise Canonical Correlation 
Methods, 15 MULTIVARIATE BEHAV. RES. 259, 259 (1980); G.J. Huba & P.M. Bentler, The Role of Peer and 
Adult Models for Drug Taking at Different Stages in Adolescence, 9 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 449 (1980). 
 228 Rachel A. Grana et al., School Disrepair and Substance Use Among Regular and Alternative High 
School Students, 80 J. SCH. HEALTH 387, 388 (2010); cf. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982) 
(noting that youth “is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence”). 
 229 See John Trebilcock, Comment, Off Campus: School Board Control over Teacher Conduct, 35 TULSA 
L.J. 445, 446–47 (2000). 
 230 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
 231 E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-24C-6(a) (Supp. 2011); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44,932(a)(1) (West 2006); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4) (West Supp. 2011); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012(2) (McKinney 2009). 
 232 See, e.g., Dominy v. Mays, 257 S.E.2d 317 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (drug possession); Sherling v. Colquitt 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1989-21 (Ga. State Bd. of Educ. Nov. 9, 1989) (drug use). 
 233 Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (expressing concern as to the role-
model effect of athletes on other students in public schools). 
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the very least, maintain the status quo; however, once they give the impression 
of being afflicted by drug use, the example set for children becomes decidedly 
negative. As the Court noted in discussing the athletes in Vernonia, the role-
model effect has the potential to “fuel[]” the drug problem in schools.234 So, 
too, school boards have an interest in controlling the role-model effect of their 
teachers, curbing the influence of any individual who may contribute to a drug 
culture. 
B. The Special Need for Teacher Drug Testing 
The preceding section discussed the unique risks that a teacher presents by 
virtue of his close custodial relationship with children. This section now takes 
those safety interests and, applying the analysis suggested in Part II.A, 
concludes that a special need for teacher drug testing exists. This conclusion 
rests upon three important observations. First, the safety risks faced in the 
school setting are uniquely experienced by teachers. Second, the safety risks 
touch on definitional aspects of the profession of public school teachers. Third, 
the nature of the school environment is such that it is currently unable to 
identify and correct teachers’ risk-creating activities before the harm has an 
opportunity to manifest. 
As to the first requirement, the safety risks created by teacher drug use are 
uniquely experienced in the school setting. Though the harms of impaired 
judgment, enablement of drug use, and negative role modeling do not occur 
solely within the school environment, they are specially facilitated by and 
rendered more substantial because of that setting.235 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court, even outside its Fourth Amendment decisions, has not hesitated to 
emphasize the heightened safety risks inherent in public schools.236 And the 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 See, e.g., Donegan v. Livingston, No. 3:11-cv-812, 2012 WL 2586862, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 3, 2012) 
(“[T]eachers inhabit a highly regulated environment which is particularly sensitive to alcohol and drug 
abuse.”). The Court’s drug testing cases of Vernonia and Earls do not intimate that the prevention of 
adolescent drug use, standing alone, presents a special need. If that were the case, every adolescent in the 
country—even at home—could be susceptible to a governmental drug testing scheme, and the Court would 
have wasted a great deal of time and paper discussing the unique attributes of the school setting. 
 236 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 425 (2007) (“In most settings, the First Amendment 
strongly limits the government’s ability to suppress speech on the ground that it presents a threat of violence. 
But due to the special features of the school environment, school officials must have greater authority to 
intervene before speech leads to violence.” (citation omitted)); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975) 
(“Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property . . . may be immediately removed 
from school [without due process].”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) 
(“[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or 
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Court’s decisions in T.L.O.,237 Acton,238 and Earls239 tell us nothing if not that 
the school context itself creates unique needs. Public schools, through their 
teachers, exercise custodial and supervisory powers over schoolchildren that 
the government could not wield over free adults.240 It would be a perverse 
result were a court to conclude that these unique responsibilities justified the 
drug testing of the class meant to be protected,241 but not the protectors. 
Second, the safety risks necessarily go to the fundamental character of the 
positions. Indeed, the supervisory duties of teachers are of such central 
importance that they have received recognition in the common law doctrine of 
in loco parentis. William Blackstone wrote of the teacher’s in loco parentis 
obligations: 
[A parent] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his 
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco 
parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed 
to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be 
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.”242 
This same responsibility was crucial in defining the school context and the 
roles individuals occupy within it, which were determinative in the Court’s 
justification for the drug testing of public school students.243 One could not 
conceive of a school district operating effectively if its teachers abandoned 
these duties.244 For this very reason, the Court appears to view the preservation 
of the school setting and its concomitant relationships as special needs.245 
 
type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of 
others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”). 
 237 See 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (“It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the 
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. . . . The school setting also requires 
some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search.”). 
 238 See 515 U.S. at 653 (“We have found . . . ‘special needs’ to exist in the public school context.”). 
 239 See 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (“Significantly, this Court has . . . held that ‘special needs’ inhere in the 
public school context.”). 
 240 Acton, 515 U.S. at 655. 
 241 See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (“[O]ur decision in Vernonia . . . depended primarily upon the 
school’s custodial responsibility and authority.”). 
 242 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453; accord 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 170 (O. Halsted 1827) (“The power allowed by law to the parent over the person of the child, 
may be delegated to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purposes of education.”). 
 243 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 & n.3. 
 244 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Without first 
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.”). 
 245 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 829. 
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Finally, the nature of the school setting and the teaching profession render 
it impossible to consistently correct the harm-creating behaviors that flow from 
drug use before they occur. Some commentators have suggested that there is 
no special need to drug test public school teachers because these employees 
hold positions for which observation is sufficient to detect impairment.246 
Teachers, they argue, encounter administrators and other staff throughout the 
day.247 Cameras often monitor hallways, and drug dogs may occasionally be 
called into a school facility.248 This argument, though, misses the point. A 
special need does not cease to exist simply because some mechanisms may 
identify users once an individual under the influence is already present in the 
school setting. If that were the case, one might wonder why a special need was 
found in Skinner and Von Raab. Certainly, those employees were also under 
the scrutiny of supervisors, coworkers, and various other forms of surveillance. 
The relevant consideration in denying a special need is not whether the 
context may allow for the identification of some users who are under the 
influence but whether that identification allows for a school to actually correct 
the harmful act before its effects manifest.249 Viewed through this lens, a 
school has a diminished capacity once a drug-using teacher has already acted 
in a way that could cause harm and the student body has been exposed to the 
particular harm-creating behavior. The eruption of violence or spread of drugs 
cannot easily be undone. We have not yet reached a point where every 
classroom comes equipped with a security guard, and so, the drug-using 
teacher still threatens lasting harm in the school setting. 
In light of these contextual considerations, there exists a special need for 
drug testing public school teachers. Absent elements that impose an abnormal 
intrusion on privacy, this special need will almost always justify a drug testing 
scheme,250 at least as long as the scheme advances the identified safety 
interests. The following section discusses the types of drug testing policies that 
a school district may permissibly employ. 
 
 246 See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Teachers—W. Va. v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883, 904 
(S.D. W. Va. 2009); Schmidt, supra note 58, at 269. 
 247 See Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 904; Schmidt, supra note 58, at 269. 
 248 See Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
 249 See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra note 114. 
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C. Efficacy and Teacher Drug Testing 
As the earlier discussion made clear, the efficacy of a given drug testing 
regime depends on whether it serves the goal of deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, or any combination. To varying extents, these goals are 
advanced through social-control mechanisms, both formal (e.g., alterations in 
the employment relationship under company policy) and informal (e.g., group 
norms).251 This section situates these purposes and their controls within the 
three categories of suspicionless drug testing schemes regularly implemented 
by public school districts: pre-employment testing, random testing, and post-
incident testing. In so doing, this section identifies the narrow circumstances in 
which a court should tilt the special needs balance against the government for a 
teacher drug testing policy’s lack of efficacy. 
When a school board decides to implement a pre-employment drug testing 
policy to screen out teachers before they ever begin working, there should be 
little doubt that the board’s safety interests are furthered. Such pre-employment 
schemes deliver both a deterrent and incapacitative effect for all individuals 
who apply for the teaching position. They are deterrent insofar as their mere 
presence and the uncertain date on which the board may act upon an 
application discourage a large number of drug users from seeking employment 
in a school district.252 In dissuading large numbers of individuals from ever 
applying to a position, these policies use the imposition of a formal 
organizational sanction—the denial of gainful employment—as a means of 
controlling the incidence of drug use among public school teachers. The testing 
also has an incapacitative effect, preventing identified drug users from entering 
a role where they could exert an influence on students or otherwise allow the 
potential harms flowing from their drug use to ever enter the schoolhouse 
gates. 
When a school board seeks to impose a completely random drug testing 
policy on its teachers, each of the three goals of punishment may be served as 
long as the policy imposes meaningful sanctions.253 Informally, the public 
school setting creates for the teacher unique, institutionally enabled bonds with 
both faculty and students. Because the teacher values the approval of both 
 
 251 See supra Part II.B. 
 252 LARSON ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 (noting that 5.6 million workers reported that they would be less 
likely to work for an employer conducting pre-employment drug testing). 
 253 See Carpenter, supra note 166, at 805 & tbl.4 (finding a high correlation between sanctioning severity 
and deterrent effect). 
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these groups, he will typically orient his actions in a way that avoids the 
creation of stigma.254 When the teacher knows that a set percentage of 
employees will necessarily be tested and that a specific punishment will be 
meted out for a failed test, the likelihood that an individual will discontinue 
using drugs increases. Termination, suspension, or compelled entry into a 
rehabilitation program sends a strong, visible message to the faculty, students, 
and even surrounding community that the individual is an “other,” incapable of 
conforming to accepted institutional norms. The avoidance of this stigma 
renders random drug testing a powerful deterrent tool. 
Formally, insofar as a particular policy calls for termination or compelled 
entry in a drug rehabilitation program following a failed drug test, a school 
district’s drug testing policy ensures that at least one goal of punishment is 
furthered. When the risk of beginning or continuing drug use is the loss of 
employment, that potential cost alone deters a substantial portion of 
employees.255 Though the mere threat of termination may deter a portion of 
employees from using drugs, for those who remain unaffected, the ex post 
enforcement of that sanction independently furthers the goal of incapacitation. 
By removing known risks currently present in the school setting, even if not 
permanently, the school board decreases or completely cuts off the possibility 
of immediate harm. When a failed drug test imposes as its sanction the 
teacher’s entry in a drug-treatment program, that policy holds further potential 
as a rehabilitative tool. Such policies take the drug user as they find him and 
attempt to lessen the incidence of drug use in the workplace by reforming the 
individual’s conduct to meet the board’s expectation of sobriety. Only in the 
absence of the sanctions identified above should a random drug testing policy 
be found wanting for lack of efficacy. 
Post-incident testing, typically predicated on the occurrence of a remote 
triggering event, is often unlikely to serve a true deterrent purpose and so 
presents the greatest potential for government abuse of the special needs 
doctrine. Consider the policy at issue in United Teachers,256 discussed at the 
beginning of this Comment. There, a school board claimed a special need for 
drug testing teachers whenever a teacher was injured in the course of his 
employment.257 The safety interests there could have served a special need; 
 
 254 See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
 255 See Carpenter, supra note 166, at 805 & tbl.4. 
 256 142 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 257 Id. at 856. 
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indeed they are the same drug-related harms that were identified as creating a 
special need earlier in this Comment. Where the policy suffered was in its 
woefully deficient sanctioning structure. A failed drug test imposed no 
stigmatizing punishment—it did not mandate termination, suspension, or any 
other change in the employment relationship that would label the individual as 
an outsider to the rest of the school community.258 Rather, the sole sanction 
imposed was the denial of worker’s compensation,259 a formal sanction so 
remote as to have little effect on the individual teacher’s balancing of costs and 
benefits when choosing whether to forego continued drug use. 
In post-incident tests like this, where neither incapacitation nor 
rehabilitation are furthered, the government subverts the special needs 
exception. The government converts the special needs exception from a shield 
for the protection of the public interest into a sword that cuts down individual 
privacy to advance its own impermissible purposes.260 Accordingly, when 
post-incident schemes are enforced, the question of efficacy turns entirely on 
the presence of meaningful sanctions, capable of effectively addressing 
individual behavior in a reactive manner—that is, termination, compelled 
rehabilitation, and the like. 
*  *  * 
The foregoing discussion, which applied the analytical tools that were 
developed in Part II and have run through each of the Court’s drug testing 
cases, showed that the safety risks created by teacher drug use create a special 
need. This Part has also showed that, even the post-incident scheme, the form 
of drug testing open to abuse, will survive special needs balancing as long as 
meaningful sanctions are imposed. Given that the identification of a special 
need almost invariably leads to the special needs balance tilting in favor of the 
government, then, school board’s teacher drug testing policies are consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment, absent exceptional intrusions on privacy.261 
Certainly, drug testing may not be a desirable option for all school districts. 
But such decisions fall squarely within the province of legislatures and local 
school boards, and should not be barred by a court’s misapplication of the 
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 260 See id. 
 261 See supra notes 114, 116. 
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special needs exception.262 The standards suggested in this Comment, by 
clarifying and fleshing out the guideposts set forth in the Supreme Court’s drug 
testing cases, provide a set of tools that courts may use to ensure, in a 
principled manner, that the special needs exception is properly applied. 
CONCLUSION 
In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis wrote 
that “[t]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”263 His words have been 
prescient, but the corollary is also true: a lack of understanding also threatens 
the government’s power to act when it should have the ability to do so. As long 
as the contours of the special needs exception remain unclear, both dangers 
remain. This Comment represents an effort to develop the special need and 
efficacy prongs of the special needs analysis to counteract the ad hoc approach 
courts often take in applying the doctrine. Using the teacher drug testing debate 
as an analytical vehicle, this Comment then illustrated the benefits that these 
standards offer in close cases of safety. Though the discussion has not 
advocated for drug testing policies in all instances, it has strived to ensure that 
each employer, considering its unique needs and resources, shall not by reason 
of the Fourth Amendment improperly be deprived of the opportunity to make 
the choice for itself. 
ANDREW MCKINLEY∗ 
 
 262 Cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 842 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I cannot know whether 
the school’s [student] drug testing program will work. But, in my view, the Constitution does not prohibit the 
effort.”). 
 263 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
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